This paper describes how mobile phone data can guide government and public health authorities in determining the best course of action to control the COVID-19 pandemic and in assessing the effectiveness of control measures such as physical distancing. It identifies key gaps and reasons why this kind of data is only scarcely used, although their value in similar epidemics has proven in a number of use cases. It presents ways to overcome these gaps and key recommendations for urgent action, most notably the establishment of mixed expert groups on national and regional level, and the inclusion and support of governments and public authorities early on.
Etiqueta: #mobileData
A report on personally identifiable sensor data from smartphone devices
In this paper, we seek to identify what types of sensor data can be collected on a
smartphone and which of those types can pose a threat to user privacy by looking into the hardware capabilities of modern smartphone devices and how smartphone data is used in the literature. We then summarize some implications that this information could have on the GDPR.
Metadata, Jailbreaking, and the Cybernetic Governmentality of iOS: Or, the Need to Distinguish Digital Privacy from digital privacy
Although Apple has routinely resisted jailbreaking citing fears over device instability, user security vulnerability, and Terms of Use violations, this article reveals that many key privacy-first jailbreaking tweaks undermine Apple’s ability to monopolize metadata flows. Theorised through a cybernetic governmentality, this intervention demonstrates the extents to which Apple goes to reify its profit-first vision of information protection, one which insulates many metadata flows from its users. Through this theoretical approach, we as analysts can critically glean awareness of the politics of the (in)visibility and (il)legibility of metadata and the role they play in the discourse on digital, mobile data protection.